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Poster Session C: Friday, August 15, 2:00 – 5:00 pm, de Brug & E‑Hall

Metacognition as modal cognition

Kevin O'Neill¹, David Lagnado¹, Stephen M. Fleming¹; ¹University College London, University of London

Presenter: Kevin O'Neill

An influential perspective is that metacognitive judgments involve forming propositional confidence in a self-centered frame of reference, evaluating the plausibility of propositions regarding one's own cognition and mental states. Here we build on this framework to propose that, because metacognition involves the consideration of alternative possibilities or hypotheses, it is an instance of a more general capacity known as modal cognition. By extension, using the Pearl causal hierarchy we distinguish between metacognition targeting conditional, interventional, and counterfactual probabilities, each of which allows one to make different kinds of inferences about one's own cognition. This view stresses the relevance of research on modal cognition for metacognition, highlights underexplored targets of metacognition, and helps explain differences between metacognitive phenomena.

Topic Area: Predictive Processing & Cognitive Control

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